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1 INTRODUCTION
When Alan Turing proposed the imitation game as a method to in-
vestigate the question if machines can think, he described a social
system. However, the various disciplines that have pursued this sem-
inal enquiry rarely touch base with sociological concepts. Cybernet-
ics developed into various interdisciplinary fields, yet it was mainly
rooted in physiological models. In the meantime, the mainstream of
AI focused on cognitive problem solving, predominately from a top-
down approach. Traditional cognitive science rests on the concept
of organisms as information processing systems - so does Artificial
Life, but from a biological simulation perspective. The recently revi-
talised branch of machine learning has been successful in deploying
bottom-up models combined with large amounts of data. Large scale
simulations of the brain are expected to deliver new knowledge about
the human brain. ”Second-generation” cognitive science and devel-
opmental robotics are embodied and apply neural computation.
One might be tempted to say that progress has been made on
brains, bodies and on models of minds. I claim that there is some-
thing largely missing in this picture, which is the social aspect. There
is Social AI, and it embraces a wide variety of topics and concerns
- from Stafford Beers cybernetic vision of society to simulations
of interacting agents, complex systems theory, language, imitation
and social learning, social network analysis and social bots, enact-
ment, human-machine interaction, augmented and virtual environ-
ments, robot assisted therapy and behavioural game theory, to name
a few. I also would like to include autonomous weapons, computer
worms and viruses, in particular crypto-ransomware, into this context
of social systems. From the other side, an interdisciplinary bridge is
constructed under the label of digital sociology. The process of mu-
tual approximation is accompanied by prolific discourses around ma-
chine ethics and emerging legal issues. A recently introduced topic
of discussion is if robots should pay taxes.
So AI observes sociology, and sociology observes AI - yet they
do not share a coherent theoretical program and fundamental on-
tological questions are still left to the philosophers. To propose an
alternative route, I consider Niklas Luhmann’s theory of social sys-
tems as a suitable foundation for guiding the development of hybrid
social systems. A hybrid social system is understood as a social as-
semblage in which minds and machines mingle: humans, machines,
certain things, cyborgs. Some animals are welcome, too.
To this end, I present a few selected features of Luhmann’s theory
and briefly visit some of their theoretical foundations: distinctions, in
particular the distinction between system and environment, autopoi-
etic systems, radical constructivism, and (second order) cybernetics.
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I speculate about some of the implications that arise from developing
hybrid social systems based on this particular direction of systems
theory.
2 ROOTS
The following description focuses on five major influences of Luh-
mann’s theory that are relevant for the present discussion.
Distinctions: The abstract foundation for Luhmann’s theory lies
in the distinction between distinction and identity. The formal back-
ground has been developed by George Spencer-Brown in his calculus
of indications. While his work ”Laws of Form” can be read as the de-
scription of a specific logical calculus, Spencer-Brown’s intention is
”proto-logical”. It demonstrates that the fundamental operation of a
system is drawing distinctions (as opposed to constructing identities).
System/Environment distinction: There are two fundamentally
different ways to observe a system. Traditionally systems are under-
stood by relations between their elements. In AI, these elements are
constructed as agents that perceive, act and communicate. The be-
haviour of the system is then observed and analysed according to
certain metrics, either derived from the individual behaviours or as
emergent properties. The second approach, going back to Ludwig
von Bertalanffy, identifies the relevant distinction for a system as the
one between the system and its environment. Those systems are op-
erationally closed and are located within the respective environments
of each other.
Autopoietic systems: the term ”autopoietic system” was coined
by Chilean biologists Humbero Maturana and Francisco Varela. Au-
topoiesis denotes the capability of a system to produce and when
necessary reproduce their own elements. To observe autopoiesis, the
respective system references are crucial. Biological cells are autopoi-
etic systems; they (re-)construct their own elements. Humans grow
legs, but do not re-grow a lost one. Axolotls do, however, with the
help of some friends.
Radical constructivism: An epistemological position regarding the
distinction between a system and its environment arises from the
school of radical constructivism. According to this view, knowledge
is not construed as a representation of an external reality, but as a
state of the system that enables some fit with the environment. Theo-
ries of acting/enactment arrive at similar conclusions from different
premises.
Second order cybernetics: the original concept of cybernetics was
developed by Norbert Wiener in his groundbreaking description of
self-regulating control loops. Second order cybernetics developed
these concepts further by introducing the observer into the obser-
vation. We arrive at systems of observers observing each other. This
paradigm shift is comparable to the one from Newton to Einstein. It
also leads to a significant but - I would argue - unavoidable concep-
tual complication.
3 SOCIAL SYSTEMS
Luhmann ties up these strands into an intrinsically general theory
of systems. He himself focuses on the development of a social the-
ory based on the work of Talcott Parsons. He incorporates Spencer-
Browns concepts of distinction and indication as the fundamental
operations of a system. In general, he distinguishes biological, psy-
chic, and social systems. These systems can be structurally coupled,
say, while writing a paper about systems theory. Yet spiking neu-
rons, thoughts and an almost finished draft that is expected for pub-
lication are located in different systems that operate with fundamen-
tally different distinctions. For Luhmann, these systems are opera-
tionally closed, They are operating in an autopoietical manner by re-
constructing their own elements, and are irritated but not determined
by their respective environments. This means that in Luhmann’s con-
text we cannot talk about concepts like social aspects of cognition,
or observe an external environment that is part of the cognitive sys-
tem. Nor can a biological system itself be social. In my opinion this
separation has the benefit to be precise about the distinctions that we
observe: in this case that the part/whole distinction has been replaced
by the one between system and environment.
Social systems (interactions, organisations and institutions) and
psychic systems (minds) operate with meaning. Meaning is under-
stood as a medium in which a system can observe the distinction be-
tween actual and potential as a form. Communication can only take
place through a social system. It requires the structurally coupled
minds to be able to distinguish between information and utterance
(Mitteilung) and to form expectations about future communication
from the side of the counterpart. Luhmann also locates knowledge
within the social system, rather than in the individual mind or brain.
4 HYBRID SOCIAL SYSTEMS
Let us return to the imitation game, and ask how the perspectives I
have sketched out above point to hybrid social systems. I have men-
tioned that the imitation game constitutes a social system, one in
which the participants have well-defined roles and tasks. Still it is
a playful setting, which is a point that is widely overlooked. The ob-
jective for the machine is to cheat, by pretending to be a woman in
place of the original male participant. It is also a game that hasn’t
been won for the machines yet, despite the current enthusiasm for
conversational interfaces.
More importantly, Turing devised the test to operationalise an idea
while avoiding definitions of the concepts he had set out to inves-
tigate. Within a distinction-based approach we can be comfortable
with the idea that no a priori definition is possible or needed for this
kind of endeavour. Instead, we need to construct and observe the on-
tological theatre, as Andrew Pickering calls it.
The system/environment distinction likewise supports Turing’s ap-
proach. We do not need to model a system from the biological ground
up and hope it will display social behaviour. Instead, we may begin
with the affordances of the social system. An agent participating in a
hybrid social system should be able to act contingent on the kind of
system, e.g. an interaction, organisation or institution. As an autopoi-
etic system, it needs to be able to develop and reproduce its elements.
It also requires an environment to co-develop with under evolution-
ary pressure. The task of the agent, its operation on a fundamental
level, is to draw distinctions.
Radical constructivism suggests that social systems involving ar-
tificial agents may construct knowledge in a way that is not only
structurally different from human knowledge - it may outright con-
tradict some of our beliefs. During a debate, we treat the statements
of our counterpart as opinions, not as facts. In the same manner, an
artificial agent forms opinions as consequences of the autopoiesis of
the system. These opinions might not necessarily be ours. In a so-
cial system, dissent does not cause logical contradictions. Instead it
is processed through different selections in the medium of meaning.
Finally, artificial social agents need to be exposed to social situa-
tions in order to develop. What the machines need to do is to learn
continuously without (permanent) supervision. They also need to ex-
pose a sufficiently large surface of perception and interaction: ma-
chines that play, robots that go hitchhiking or share our beds or roam
the campus while politely avoiding humans, machines that perform
art for a robotic audience, artbots that judge each other, exhibitions
where humans need not apply, social bots that influence elections.
These approaches are being explored and we need more of them.
When we design hybrid social systems, the key lies not in design-
ing the system, it lies in the interaction between the system and its
environment. This suggests to release the machines from the lab as
soon as a minimum of functionality is implemented. The machines
need to be out there and they need to be among us.
5 CONCLUSION AND FURTHER WORK
Nearly three quarters of a century after Turing devised his test, the
imitation game is still suitable to direct our efforts towards hybrid so-
cial systems. Even when deep learning has successfully tackled con-
versation (I imagine based on a similar strategy as the one for playing
Go), Turing’s methodology is still valid for pursuing the puzzles that
remain unsolved.
Cybernetics and Artificial Intelligence have in more than one sense
parted ways during the last decades. While AI has been more and
more able to demonstrate practical success, it rarely reflects its epis-
temological foundations. Cybernetics, on the other hand, has been
abandoned for the wrong reasons. In my view the complexity im-
posed through second order observation is a necessary condition for
understanding social interactions. The question is not how to evade
the problem but how to implement it. I think it will be fruitful to re-
examine both paradigms, especially in the light of recent progress in
robotics and machine learning. With this in mind, Luhmann’s the-
ory has the benefit to enable analysing, describing and constructing
systems within a coherent ontological framework that accounts for
biological, psychic and social systems. Therefore I propose to model
interactions between human and non-human agents as hybrid social
systems. Only on the level of social systems the machines will be-
come more human.
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